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Abstract
WinSight is a distributed firewall and network monitoring system capable of consid-
ering packets’ host context when making flow decisions and is developed for Windows
7. With WinSight, machines on a given network have an agent installed which reports
incoming and outgoing packet flows to a controller, which sends a response if the flow
is deemed safe. Machines with WinSight will not accept a packet flow unless the con-
troller approves that flow. To increase defense against internal network threats, such
as worms and compromised machines, we developed both an agent and a controller
which follows a popular standard called OpenFlow. Our testing showed WinSight is
able to successfully block traffic based on context data and deep packet inspection with
a moderate performance impact, with the first packet of each flow most affected. There
were also rare, yet significant delays when reinjecting packets into the host’s network
stack.
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1 Introduction
Networks, especially enterprise networks, are a vital component of communication.
The importance of networks brings the motivation to attack them. It is possible to
disrupt or halt network services through denial of service (DoS) and malware attacks.
These attacks can come externally from the Internet or internally from a machine
on the network. In either case, the severity can vary from minor inconveniences to
catastrophic data leaks and system failures.
To combat these attacks, systems like personal firewalls, distributed firewalls, and
network access control lists (ACL), have been created. Broadly speaking, these systems
monitor the traffic on the network to prevent unauthorized and malicious packets from
circulating. These systems can deter and halt malicious traffic on the network, but
they are limited. The information they draw from to analyze traffic is often limited
to networking data, such as source and destination addresses. While this is useful for
blocking known exterior threats, it is less useful in blocking unknown interior threats.
For example, if a trusted machine becomes compromised by a worm, most firewalls lack
the sophistication to detect and block the malicious traffic without human intervention.
To enable and expand malicious traffic detection and prevention, we present Win-
Sight. WinSight combines host context extraction with OpenFlow control for end
hosts, creating a distributed firewall with simple whole-network monitoring. To realize
WinSight on the Windows 7+ platform we develop the following:
• An extension to OpenFlow PacketIns allowing for context to be transmitted in-
band
• A Windows OpenFlow Agent, which captures incoming and outgoing packets
flows, sends them to the controller, and re-injects approved packet flows
• A Windows OpenFlow datapath prototype, which provides the functionality that
enables the OpenFlow Agent, and proposal for future work
• A Windows Host context extraction, which extracts relevant context to be ap-
pended to PacketIns
WinSight’s context extraction is powerful because it allows the monitor to consider
the environment from which the traffic originated. This includes the current username,
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process ID, path to executable and executable name, and the window title. Including
this data when monitoring a network greatly increases the scope of the network’s
security, as it allows network monitors to infer the intent of the application sending the
packet. Host context data can be used to analyze traffic more deeply and automatically
determine if the traffic is malicious. For instance, the network monitor can have a list
of usernames who are allowed to send and receive HTTP packets. If a user not on that
list, such as a guest or back-door user, attempts to send HTTP traffic, that flow can
be blocked.
WinSight has a few key advantages over existing network security systems in ad-
dition to host context data. Unlike a standard firewall which operates only on traffic
going to and from the Internet, WinSight operates on all traffic being sent within the
network. This allows internal threats, such as compromised computers connected to
the network, to be addressed. Additionally, WinSight does not require the computers
to enforce security policy. In a traditional distributed firewall, when there is an update
to security policy, that update must be pushed to the computers in the network. If the
network is under constant threat, this makes new attacks difficult to react to. With
WinSight, security policy is enforced by the OpenFlow controller, meaning security
policy updates need only be installed on a single machine. This allows the monitor
to immediately react to new attacks, and avoids the need to constantly push security
policy updates.
To provide this protection, WinSight makes a few assumptions. It assumes the
trusted computing base includes the operating system and all subsystems it is running
on top of; this means that we do not protect against attacks that compromise the oper-
ating system, such as rootkits. WinSight also assumes that the OpenFlow controller is
secure. Due to the nature of SDN, WinSight introduces a DoS vector: if the controller
becomes unavailable, the host machines will be unable to forward packet flows. This
is an inherent limitation of centralized software-defined networking controllers and is
an active area of research for SDN [28].
In this paper, we discuss the following. Section 2 provides background information
and research previously done in the field of network security which relates to WinSight,
including an overview of software-defined networking and it’s uses for security. Section
3 details the inner workings and design rational of WinSight. Sections 4 and 5 detail
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the performance and usability testing conducted on WinSight, as well as the outcomes.
Section 6 details our final thoughts of WinSight, potential areas of improvement, and
a trial deployment. While WinSight is designed to expand security policy design, we
do not discuss policy design in this paper.
2 Background and Related Work
A network allows computers to transmit data packets to other machines that are con-
nected. A local area network (LAN) is a type of network which is confined to a small
area, such as an enterprise or home. Many LANs are connected to the Internet, and
serve as a medium for computers to access Internet sites and services. An enterprise
network is a type or LAN which is used by a business to connect its various departments.
Enterprise networks allow businesses to efficiently share resources across departments,
and often employ special security to control the network privileges of users and defend
the network from malware.
2.1 Malicious Software (Malware)
Malware describes any unwanted program which engages in malicious activity on a
computer. The impact of malware can have a variety effects, including unwanted
pop-ups, data leakage, engaging in denial of service (DoS) attacks, and creation of
back-door entrances to otherwise secure software. Some forms of malware are designed
to propagate. For instance, a virus is a form of malware which inserts copies of itself
into another program, becoming part of it. As the program is used, the virus spreads
itself to other programs and machines, leaving a wake of infection. A worm is a form of
malware which spreads across networks by exploiting vulnerabilities in target systems.
Worms use file-transport features in target systems to spread autonomously, limiting
the need for assistance from its creator or its victims. A trojan is a form of malware that
masquerades as a legitimate piece of software. They are not inherently self-replicating,
but can be sent across networks by malicious or naive users and other forms of malware.
Through malware, it is possible for a computer to become part of a botnet, a network
of machines infected with malware that all report to a central machine. Botnets can
be used for flood-based attacks or mass data collection [11].
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If a computer storing sensitive data is compromised by some form of malware, the
damages can be costly. According to a survey presented by Ponemon Institute, the
average company losses attributed to cybercrime in the United States was roughly
$15.42 billion as of August 2015 [1]. In a survey of types of cyber attacks in 2015,
by Ponemon Institute, 100% of respondents reported attacks from viruses, worms, and
trojans; 97% reported attacks from general malware; and 36% reported denial of service
(DoS) attacks [2]. It was also estimated by the Identity Theft Research Center that
roughly 781 million data breaches had occurred within the United States in 2015, with
an estimated 169 million records exposed [3].
Further evidence of the impact of malware is described by Kuchan Lan [18], who
ran an experiment to describe the impact of DDoS and Worm attacks on a network.
To detect attacks, Kuchan Lan [18] captured packets and ran them through a detec-
tion script which flags packets if a large number of source IPs connect to the same
destination IP in a second. Once packets were flagged, they were manually analyzed to
confirm the presence of an attack. Packet flow latency for flows less than 100KB and
Domain Name System (DNS) look-up latency were measured to analyze the impact of
an attack. Unsurprisingly, DDoS attacks were found to slow down both packet flow
latency and DNS look-up time. Kuchan Lan [18] also describes worms to be able to
infect many hosts in a short period of time. The Apache mod_ssl worm, also described
as the Slapper Worm in the paper, infected hosts and can automatically trigger DDoS
attacks. The Slapper Worm did not cause significant traffic by itself, but a coordinated
attack from infected machines could cause a widespread DDoS.
In order to understand the dynamics of malware protection, Lelarge [20] models
the risks of malware epidemics and the dynamics of overall security in a network. In
the model, users who do not protect their computers by consistently updating their
anti-virus software and operating system put a network at risk when connecting to
it. The model assumes that infected computers can spread their infection due to the
nature of the malware, and studies the epidemic spread of worms and viruses, as well
as alerts and patches, in a network. In situations where all agents (owners of computers
connected to a network) invest greatly in self protection, the general security of the
network is higher. However, self-interested agents may not maintain their level of
security as the overall security of the network is high enough that the cost of self-
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security is hard to justify. This leads to greedy agents discontinuing their protection
to save costs, creating a downward spiral which results in an insecure network. In
situations where protection is monopolized by a provider who is not responsible for the
well-being of individual agents also results in an insecure network, as the provider has
little incentive to provide quality protection. From this research, we can conclude that
requiring agents to manage their own security in an enterprise network is not optimal.
2.2 Trusted Computing Base
Developing software to combat malware can be tricky, so developers must know the
attack vectors they intend to close. This means we must define a trusted computing
base. The trusted computing base (TCB) is the set of hardware and software which we
must implicitly trust, whether trustworthy or not, to make any progress in a security
analysis of a system [19]. Without specifying a trusted computing base, it could always
be argued that some portion, such as the operating system or worse the boot-time rou-
tine of the hardware, is vulnerable. However, advances in security-related computing
have led to a secure bootstrap, allowing us to trust that the low level components of our
system have not been tampered with [4]. This means we trust that our BIOS, kernel,
and operating system have not been compromised. It does not mean, however, that we
can trust that there are no vulnerabilities in any of these systems. When developing
WinSight, we assume every subsystem running below our userspace application and
kernel module is trusted.
2.3 Firewalls
One of the most common protections against malware is a firewall. Firewalls were
proposed in various forms as a way to protect vulnerable systems from a malicious
network. The “modern” incarnation of a firewall is a packet filtering firewall invisible
to the user of a network. It detects malicious traffic based on sophisticated rules
created from years of observations of exploits, and it prevents any activity matching
those rules from entering. Many of these rules are in the form of an a network access
control list (network ACL). They can also be extended to represent user permissions to
certain objects within the network, in addition to basic Internet restrictions. Network
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ACLs are able to explicitly block a user from accessing a certain resource on a network
based on the networking information of their request, such as their IP address or port
number.
A firewall is responsible for enforcing network security policy at the junction of two
networks by controlling which traffic is allowed to pass through it. Policy is defined
as the decision-making process behind a firewall. There are many kinds of firewalls.
A traditional firewall is a system at the boundary between two networks which has
some mechanism to allow or disallow the passage of traffic [16]. A personal firewall is
often used to enforce policy for a single machine. When describing the security base
of a traditional firewall, we can imagine that the host is the single node interior of
the network and everything else the exterior. The assumption that all firewalls have
to make is that traffic on the inside of a network is trusted, because without user
specifications or previous configuration they have no basis upon which to discriminate.
This does not necessarily always prove to be true, as anything from unaware and
compromised users to malicious users might engage in attacks which the firewall cannot
detect.
Firewalls became necessary in the late 1980s as Internet use became more widespread
and grew as an attack target. For example, when the Morris worm was released [26],
the United States government realized German spies were extracting information from
computer systems, and security quickly began requiring further attention. Securing
systems at the user level was the first step, but many of the systems in use had bugs
and vulnerabilities that left them exposed [6].
2.4 Distributed Firewalls
In the case of traditional and personal firewalls, both have room for improvement.
A traditional firewall provides no insight into network-wide traffic, and a personal
firewall provides no centralized control. The lack of centralized control with personal
firewalls can make the overall security state of the network ambiguous, as well as make
network-wide security updates tedious. The middle ground between these two is a
distributed firewall which combines centralized control with distributed enforcement [6].
A distributed firewall is not a physical box in the way that a traditional firewall might
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be, but rather a specification of policy for all users of a network. Various schemes have
been proposed, but all distributed firewalls must consist of a way to express network
policy, a mechanism for distributing policy to end hosts securely, and a mechanism for
enforcing policy at end hosts. With all three specified, any trusted end-host will enforce
policy as specified by network operators. A distributed firewall removes the assumption
of restricted network topology, removes entirely the performance bottlenecks inherent
in such a restricted topology, and ensures that all network interior communication
follows a specified security policy.
Ioannidis et al. [17] implement a demonstration distributed firewall using their
proposed policy language KeyNote. The authors specify the language and policy en-
forcement, even a signing scheme, but not the distribution of policy. Instead they state
that it could be distributed using various boot-time techniques or file sharing services.
The advantage of distributed firewalls is that they do not depend on restricting
network topology. The often-cited example is that policy can still apply to a telecom-
muting user, reducing risk that security vulnerabilities might be transmitted over a
VPN. However, while distributed firewalls are effective at blocking known malicious
traffic, they are not as effective at detecting new threats. Similarly, a network ACL
is only effective at blocking traffic based on defined rules, and can only block based
on networking information. A traditional distributed firewalls and network ACLs are
unable to see the context from which the packet was sent. Such context can include
the current user logged into the source computer, the executable file name of the pro-
gram sending the traffic, and even the window title of said program. If the context
were included in the evaluation space, network administrators could have the ability
to prevent whole programs or users from sending traffic, rather than just IP addresses
and port numbers.
2.5 Software-defined Networking
A rising recent method of network management that is somewhat similar to distributed
firewalls is software-defined networking (SDN). SDN separates two planes of operation
in networking which are normally coupled together: the control plane and the data
plane. The control plane describes the functions that dictate packets’ immediate desti-
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nations in order to reach their final destination. The data plane describes the functions
that dictate the method in which packets are forwarded to their immediate destina-
tions. With SDN, the control plane is handled by an external SDN controller and the
data plane is handled by the network switches. This allows network traffic control to
be accessed from a single device, making it programmable. When applied to network
security, SDN can be used to block malicious traffic from traversing the network. How-
ever, many forms of SDN for security are limited to only networking information, such
as the source and destination IP address of a packet, when evaluating traffic. A policy
that is set on a specific set of addresses is usually referred to as a fine-grained policy,
whereas a coarse-grained policy will operate on larger groupings such as subnets or an
entire protocol.
SDNs incorporate these ideas in varying ways, and one of the most common SDN
standards is OpenFlow. OpenFlow is described as the first standard communications
interface defined between the control and forwarding layers of an SDN architecture. It
allows networks to be highly programmable and flexible by allowing remote manage-
ment of a switch’s packet forwarding tables. As its name suggests, OpenFlow is freely
distributed and open source.
OpenFlow was built off of Ethane, presented by Casado et al. [10], which was
a network configuration that implemented a central controller that enforces a global
network policy on all network traffic. In order to give the controller full visibility, special
switches are placed in the network which send all received packet flows, sequences of
packets with the same source and destination, to the controller for evaluation. These
switches can be implemented without any host modification and can be installed with
minimal network interruption. Ethane offers the benefit of tracking the entire network
topology on a single machine, which makes network state changes easier to account
for. Ethane also enables a way to reconstruct all network activity, which is useful for
diagnosing configuration faults and discovering unwanted activity.
A year later, McKeown et al. [22] presented OpenFlow, a standard which expands on
Ethane to allow network protocol experimentation without exposing the internal work-
ings of the switches. Similar to Ethane, OpenFlow works by having special switches
placed in the network, which communicate traffic information to a controller. Open-
Flow switches contain a packet flow table, and an action associated with each flow.
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Figure 1: Heterogeneous network devices controlled by standardized OpenFlow
protocol
Each unmatched packet flow is escalated to the controller via an OpenFlow header
specified as a PacketIn message. The controller then makes a decision on the flow
and relays it to the switch using a PacketOut, or in some cases a FlowModification
(FlowMod). Based on the message from the controller, the switch will take one of
several actions on the flow. These actions include forwarding the packets along the
network, and dropping them entirely. OpenFlow specifies a standardized interface for
flow matching and control protocols, as depicted in Figure 1, preventing network ad-
mins from having to write their own control protocols, and making the entire network
programmable from the controller. This makes it possible for network administrators
to write and implement network applications. These applications can perform actions
such as granting special privileges to certain machines and blocking packet flows with
specific values in their headers.
2.6 Software-defined Networking for Security Applications
Software-defined Networking presents a unique opportunity for security applications.
It combines the policy enforcement power of middleboxes and firewalls as described
above, with the lack of topology restrictions of a distributed firewall. This is all enabled
by a standardized programmatic interface, allowing for arbitrary applications to be
developed and possibly combined in novel ways [23]. This standardized interfaces makes
12
applications broadly applicable to networks; they need not be aware of implementation
details at the network layer. Applications are completely orthogonal to the network
itself, allowing both to evolve independently.
Given this confluence of factors, many different security applications have been
explored using SDN for enforcement. Firewalls have of course been re-implemented and
distributed through the network [14] with later extensions to handle the statefulness
of transport protocols [12]. Anomaly detection, normally a very expensive operation,
was made computationally cheap by using OpenFlow PacketIn messages [23]. In a
similar vein, OpenFlow made it simpler for a network to detect and mitigate a DDoS
[9], though caveats about saturating a network’s uplink still apply.
An interesting concept has recently been explored where policy resolution and en-
forcement are decoupled [7]. If an OpenFlow controller performs computationally ex-
pensive policy resolution calculations we might quickly overwhelm it, especially as it
continues its role in policy enforcement. Instead we might be able to forward PacketIns
or even redirect flows through “traditional” middlebox network appliances. The middle-
boxes can then perform some computationally expensive policy resolutions and return
a response to the OpenFlow controller, which enforces the policy across the network
in the form of flow table entries. In this way the negative side effects of middleboxes
can be avoided. Only traffic which needs policy resolution traverses the middlebox,
avoiding sub-optimal routing, and similarly the middlebox is not overwhelmed trying
to process unrelated traffic.
2.7 Security of Software-defined Networking
Software-defined Networking provides new and exciting opportunities, for both network
operators and attackers. The network operator has new found power and control over
their network, but so too does the would-be network intruder [29]. SDN suffers from
some of the same pitfalls as do traditional networks, and introduces several new ones.
The switch and data plane open up new vulnerabilities. An OpenFlow switch has
limited resources for storing flow table entries, so an attacker could wreak havoc by
generating traffic which causes the flow table to become filled. With a full flow table
the switch now has to make a full PacketIn round trip for each new flow and network
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performance deteriorates significantly [13].
Attackers can also target the OpenFlow controller. If not properly hardened, an
attacker could attack the host operating system in any number of ways and disrupt
network availability. An attacker can impersonate the OpenFlow controller using a
simple man-in-the-middle attack if the OpenFlow channel is left unencrypted. Worse
yet, it is possible for attackers to infiltrate the OpenFlow controller and silently create
fraudulent flow table entries. With such control, the attacker will have great power
over the network [15].
2.8 Host Context and Security
Network security applications can leverage user-generated context to inform policy
decisions.
Shirley and Evans [30] used context to determine whether traffic originated from a
user action or not. In the latter case, attempts to access a previously-unknown address
were manually validated by users with a modal dialogue. The authors use data gathered
from a university campus to show that most users have relatively regular Internet usage
habits. Accordingly, this approach would incur only a small initial workload and an
even smaller ongoing overhead for the user. The authors described that future work
might collect and aggregate acceptance and refusal from users to make decisions on a
network rather than per user level. However, they provide no mechanism for collection
of this information nor enforcement of network policy.
MacFarland and Shue [21] explore a slightly different take on context for security,
allowing information extracted from a graphical user interface to highlight periods
when “sensitive” activity is taking place on a machine. With this information system
logs can be scanned during sensitive activity to identify malicious behavior. This same
technology has been demonstrated on Windows in [32] using a tool called Detours
which allows system calls to be replaced by arbitrary functions. This was used to
implement an interceptor which pulled text from the GUI into logs for analysis. Both
of these technologies can be used to enable real-time context extraction without user
intervention.
Taylor et al. [31] develop a system that is the inspiration for our own. It allows
14
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Figure 2: High Level Diagram
centralized control of network policy with fast updates similar to OpenFlow. Unlike
the original conception of OpenFlow, it uses host machines for enforcement of policy
rather than commodity Ethernet switches. This has the benefit that there is no possi-
ble way for the network to become saturated with rules. If a host wanted to perform
communication with some other host, it needs at least the memory available for a filter
rule, and with memory capacity growing so quickly the point is nearly moot. This
implementation was designed for Linux and leans heavily on the Linux kernel subsys-
tem netfilter chains which are optimized for high performance. Unfortunately, the
original prototype was plagued with connection setup latency because the agent that
installed filter rules was written in Python and ran slowly. Additionally the implemen-
tation was not compliant with OpenFlow, making integration into existing networks
difficult at best.
3 System Architecture
In this chapter, we introduce the design of our OpenFlow-compatible and context-aware
distributed firewall, WinSight, and the details of its implementation on Windows 7+.
Further, the libraries we use claim to be compatible with Windows Vista.
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3.1 Overview
Our design consists of three main components: WinDivert, a kernel space packet filter
for intercepting and reinjecting network traffic; a hand-written OpenFlow Agent, inter-
facing with WinDivert and extracting contextual information; and POX, a widely-used
OpenFlow controller. The kernel filter catches all the traffic sent to or from the host
machine that is not destined for or sent from the controller. The OpenFlow agent gets
packets from the kernel datapath and checks for an existing matching rule. If a rule
is not present, the agent gathers context for the packet then escalates it to our POX
module. When the agent receives a response from POX, the packet is either dropped
or re-injected depending on the decision. POX is an OpenFlow controller written in
Python which makes decisions about whether to allow or reject a network flow. We
created a module for POX to extract our context information and make decisions based
on it.
Our project targets Windows 7, but should be backwards-compatible to Win-
dows Vista and forwards-compatible to Windows 8 or 10 as well. This assumption
is untested, but is based on information reported by the documentation for the Mi-
crosoft Developers Network and external libraries. Since WinSight is targeted towards
corporations and large businesses, it is in our interests to develop primarily for Win-
dows 7 as it is currently the most common OS used. However, support for Windows
10 is desirable given Microsoft is encouraging businesses to update to it as the new
standard, and it may be widely adopted in the coming years.
The libraries used are exclusively native Windows APIs defined as having long-term
support, including the WinSock and Windows Driver Framework libraries. Some li-
braries are included for function calls when providing context, such as libpsapi and
libiphlpapi. These libraries also are cited as being both backwards- and forwards-
compatible with other versions of the Windows operating system. We are using
MingW32 for compilation of the Win32API and WinSock code [25]. Next we examine
the various pieces of our system architecture.
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3.1.1 OpenFlow Agent
The OpenFlow agent is the heart of WinSight. The agent enforces network policy by
inspecting all traffic, escalating unidentified flows to a central controller, and gathering
contextual information from the operating system. Network traffic flows in and out
of the agent through WinDivert, a kernel driver that interfaces with the Windows
Filtering Platform. When a packet comes in, the agent checks it against our existing
flow tables; if it matches the agent passes it along, and if not the agent escalates it
to a central controller. If there is no match in the flow table, an explicit DROP rule is
added per the OpenFlow version 1.3 specification as an optimization. On escalation,
the agent calls into a number of Windows APIs to gather information about the flow,
which are discussed later, that describes what process originated the packet and who
started that process.
When deciding whether to drop or re-inject a packet, our application inspects a
flow table. This table is represented as a binary tree and stores an action (represented
as an integer) and expiration time (a configurable time_t value, seconds since the
Unix epoch) as its values. The table is indexed using an integer representation of the
traditional network 5-tuple, consisting of the binary representation of the source and
destination IP, the source and destination port, and the protocol. If the flow table does
not contain an entry for the tuple generated from the packet headers, it will buffer the
packet. Next, the agent sends an OpenFlow PacketIn message to the controller to
determine if the flow should be allowed.
This PacketIn message contains a copy of the source packet and appended context
data, formatted as described in subsubsection 3.2.2. If no context data could be found,
a binary zero is appended. Prior to sending the PacketIn, the packet is appended to
a ring buffer, allowing us to look up a packet by a continually increasing 32 bit buffer
ID instead of requiring the controller to return the packet data.
We chose a circular buffer as opposed to a map because we consider the relative ef-
ficiency of O(n) versus O(1) a reasonable loss when compared to the memory overhead.
This holds particularly because in the case of a “drop” decision, a PacketOut will not
be sent, requiring manual tracking of old packets and removal of an old node from the
map. However, a circular buffer will wrap around and overwrite an old value without
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Figure 3: Thread Functionality
any additional statefulness. The ring buffer is indexed by a truncated ID, but also
contains a non-truncated ID to allow verification that the packet was not overwritten
by buffer overflowing between sending a PacketIn and receiving a PacketOut. If the full
ID between the PacketOut and the entry in the buffer do not match, the PacketOut is
ignored as we have already dropped the old data. If a packet is dropped, it is left in the
buffer until the ID sequence wraps around and it is overwritten with a new packet. The
buffer is currently sized for 2048 packets, but this is trivially modifiable if in testing
that is found to be insufficient.
To avoid blocking and thereby increase performance in our agent, we employ pairs
of threads. The number of thread pairs is passed in as a command line argument.
The first of each pair sets up a communication channel with the OpenFlow controller,
spawns its partner thread which is responsible for re-injecting packets, and then blocks
on receiving a packet from the WinDivert handle (which is thread-safe according to
their documentation and our tests). When the first of the two threads receives data
from the handle, it either immediately re-injects it or escalates the packet to the con-
troller depending on the existence and value of a flow table entry. Since both threads
share a socket connected to the controller, the re-injection thread is able to block on
a WinDivertRecv call without impeding the primary thread, which is responsible for
receiving packets from the network stack. When the second thread receives a Pack-
etOut from the controller, it then checks the packet for a buffer ID and re-injects the
appropriate packet, if the buffer IDs are an exact match. It then adds an entry to
the flow table indicating the appropriate action. The flow table that the thread pairs
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use is shared globally, but the packet buffer is only shared between the two threads in
the pair. This optimizes the program such that there are not duplicate PacketIns for
the same flow and each set of threads can buffer their own packets, minimizing buffer
overrun.
3.2 WinDivert
Windows Packet Divert [5], or WinDivert, is a kernel mode driver that interfaces with
the Windows Filtering Platform to divert traffic out of the kernel and into userspace.
During initialization, WinDivert creates a handle into the Windows Filtering Platform
[24] and registers callouts for the transport layer. When the Windows Filtering Plat-
form kernel-mode filtering engine receives traffic it calls out to the WinDivert code.
This code classifies the traffic according to a user-specified filter, detaining any that
match. After blocking the specified traffic, WinDivert places it in a queue to be read
by a userspace client. WinDivert also exposes the Windows Filtering Platform injec-
tion APIs, thereby allowing userspace code to inject packets into the network stack.
Communication with WinDivert happens through a Windows file; all interaction with
WinDivert from userspace is actually through IO controls (ioctls). WinSight uses Win-
Divert to pull all traffic into userspace where it can process it and reinject compliant
traffic only.
From userspace we initialize WinDivert by calling WinDivertOpen with a filter. The
WinDivert driver gets installed and runs through its initialization routines. WinDivert
sets up a Windows Driver Framework I/O device, opens a Windows Filtering Platform
handle with FwpmEngineOpen0, creates a Windows Filtering Platform injection handle
with FwpsInjectionHandleCreate0, and installs its callouts into the Windows Filter-
ing Platform. There are two injection handles created, one for IPv4 and another for
IPv6. A total of six callouts are installed: three each for IPv4 and IPv6 in the inbound,
outbound, and forward layers.
The Windows Filtering Platform kernel-mode filtering engine consists of the fol-
lowing elements: shims, the filtering engine, layers, sublayers, and callouts. Shims are
closed systems provided by Microsoft that extract information for each layer of the
filtering engine, which consists of multiple layers that correspond roughly to the OSI
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layered-network model. Each layer consists of sublayers, where filters and callouts can
be installed. Finally, callouts are independently-developed code that performs some
kind of packet analysis not possible with the filtering engine, such as WinDivert.
A filter or a callout can result in one of four actions: CONTINUE, BLOCK, ACCEPT, or
VETO. A filter will statically match against packets, and if it matches some action is
applied, otherwise it will return CONTINUE.
CONTINUE is a no-op. The MSDN documentation does not include FWP_ACTION_CONTINUE,
but it does exist in the APIs. BLOCK and ACCEPT do as their names suggest. VETO is
used for blocking even a higher-priority filter, which is critical for an application such
as ours.
Within a layer in the filtering engine, many filters could come to different decisions
about a packet. There are filter arbitration rules to handle this. Each sublayer is a
set of filters which are ordered by priority. These filters are executed until one of them
matches and returns an action other than CONTINUE. All sublayers are executed for a
given layer, and higher-priority sublayers take precedence. If two sublayers return con-
flicting actions, arbitration determines which sublayer has higher priority. WinDivert
installs its callouts into a separate high-priority sublayer in six different layers. It does
this to avoid ever being preempted or skipped by some other filter, and to ensure that
its decision always takes precedence.
When a packet reaches the Windows Filtering Platform network layer it calls out
to windivert_classify_callout. It first checks to make sure that a packet was not
injected by itself. Without this verification, then a packet would be filtered, reinjected,
and filtered again endlessly in an infinite loop. Next it calls windivert_filter to check
the packet against an internal filter generated by parsing a string provided by the user.
WinSight wants all traffic in the network, so it uses the filter “true”, excluding the
traffic sent to or from the controller. If the packet does not match the filter, it is
immediately reinjected into the network without ever leaving kernel space, or copying
the packet inside of WinDivert. If it does match the filter, then the packet gets blocked
and copied into a reader queue awaiting a user application, and all pending applications
are notified.
The read queue is a standard I/O queue from the Windows Driver Framework with
manual dispatching. Manual dispatching means that WinDivert maintains full control
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over when read requests are serviced. WinDivert needs to maintain control because
network activity is unpredictable and, once it accepts a read request, it either has to
service it or cancel it; therefore if it blocks waiting for a packet, the kernel blocks with
it. To avoid that, WinDivert keeps user applications blocked until it has a packet to
deliver. Read requests are serviced by WDF work items, which are basically kernel-
mode worker pools. A work item services a request by pulling a copied packet out of
the head of the read queue and copying it into a buffer in user space, using standard
WDF APIs.
As with all queues in networking applications, this read queue can become filled;
WinDivert has two strategies for handling this. The queue has a maximum size of 1024
entries: and if a packet arrives and exceeds this length, it gets dropped. In addition
WinDivert has a timer which manages a Boolean ticktock and purges from the read
queue any packets that do not match. By default, the time runs with a period of 512
ms. WinDivert drops from the tail in a fairly conventional way, and then purges the
head of the queue periodically to keep the queue from getting overly stale.
From userspace, WinDivert provides a DLL that includes a simple API for clients
to use. WinDivertRead handles creating an IOCTL representing a read request and
submitting it to the file object that WinDivert exposes. WinDivertWrite similarly
handles a write to the WinDivert device and initiates an injection into the Windows
Filtering Platform.
The write side of WinDivert is more straightforward. A user-space application
issues an IOCTL write request and WinDivert immediately serves it by calling out
into one of three Windows Filtering Platform functions depending on the destina-
tion of the packet: FwpsInjectForwardAsync0, FwpsInjectNetworkSendAsync0, or
FwpsInjectNetworkReceiveAsync0. These are all asynchronous calls which return
immediately, before the injection operation has actually completed and the packet
data is no longer needed. Instead, WinDivert registers a callback with these functions
and when injection is completed, it frees the memory used for storing the packet and
completes the write request, unblocking the calling application.
We do not fully understand WinDivert’s decision to block an application until the
injection completes. It is logical for an application that wants to be sure that the
injection succeeds, but it does not match the needs of WinSight. WinDivert has to
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copy the packet out of userspace to submit it to the Windows Filtering Platform, so
the application does not have to be blocked for memory safety. WinSight does not care
if injection fails, and if reinjection fails WinDivert could indicate that a network buffer
is full. In that case, the traffic should just get dropped, as is standard in most network
appliances, thereby eliminating the need for blocking behavior.
3.2.1 OpenFlow Controller
We use POX to act as our OpenFlow controller. We selected POX due to the Python
development environment and ease of extension. POX has an event-driven architecture,
allowing us to hook directly into the PacketIn event to parse the additional context
data our system sends. The work done on POX was trivial: we simply installed a
current version and added a module capable of understanding the additional context
we were appending to the packet.
This module inspects all PacketIns for context data and makes some policy decision
based on it using hard-coded logic, as we simply needed to test that what was being
sent was correct and actionable. If the PacketIn describes a flow that complies with our
basic policy expressions, the module generates a PacketOut message corresponding to
the flow and communicates it to our OpenFlow Agent. If the flow does not comply then
we send nothing and exit the handling function; the flow will be silently dropped by
the host OpenFlow agent due to the default DROP rule that is installed automatically.
3.2.2 Context
For the scope of this project, we define context as additional information associated
with a flow and its resultant PacketIn, which allow a controller to make better-informed
policy decisions. There is tremendous value in this data, but collecting it is nontrivial
and it complicates the packet escalation process. Context can only be extracted in
a user-space scope where we have access to local processes, their security descriptors,
and other similar information. This means that there is some necessary computation
and delay getting information in and out of kernel space. Once this data is collected
we have to send it along to our central controller. OpenFlow provides no standardized
mechanism to do this.
There are several options for sending additional contextual information associated
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Figure 4: Context within OpenFlow PacketIn message
with a PacketIn. Our OpenFlow agent could send a PacketIn, and our controller
could query the agent for information it desires. This approach has the benefit of
saving some communication cost if context information is discarded, but forces the
controller to have deep buffers for PacketIns while it waits for context query responses.
To mitigate this controller-side buffering expense, we could instead send the context
information appended to our PacketIn. This forces the buffering burden on the agent,
which prevents us from easily overloading a single point of failure. The cost to this
approach is we have to decide how we are going to append this information.
One option is to append the context information to the TCP stream, outside of
the OpenFlow PacketIn message envelope. If we do this, then we have to strip this
information out of the TCP stream, before it reaches the OpenFlow controller. This is
problematic as our implementation would require either modifying the TCP stream or
performing a man-in-the-middle attack our OpenFlow channel to insert and strip this
data. If we directly modify the TCP stream, we would need to write low-level code
for the kernel of our controller host to transparently strip the information and deliver
it to the controller over another path. This couples our deployment to a particular
operating system and also violates the semantics of TCP streams. We could instead
man-in-the-middle attack our OpenFlow channel and have a userspace context stripper,
which decouples us from an operating system, but requires us to establish some other
secondary channel to the OpenFlow controller.
The other option for appending context is to insert it inside the message envelope.
The OpenFlow specification states that the data portion of a PacketIn is meant to
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contain a partial Ethernet frame, but we found no part of our system that actually
enforces this assumption. We can then just insert whatever data we want into the
data field, including our context. In our demonstration, we send entire packets in our
PacketIns, meaning that our controller can do full deep packet inspection if it wants
to, and the context data will not interfere, as it is distinguishable from the rest of the
packet due to the included size. We acknowledge that the ability to arbitrarily append
data to an OpenFlow PacketIn is a viable attack vector, as there is no reason malicious
data could not be inserted in the position of our context. However since we assume
that the subsystems are trusted, no other program with access to the packets should
be able to intercept and modify them maliciously.
In appending data to PacketIns, we used a hard-coded set of fields. The data
constituting the context is newline-delimited, and should a newline be present in any
of the context data, it is replaced by a space. We extract context data by finding
the process originating a flow, and using that knowledge to look at the source and
destination ports and matching them to a pairing in the TCP or UDP state tables.
We can then extract the following:
• [int] Process ID
• [char, <256 bytes] Path to executable, including executable name
• [char, <256 bytes each] User and domain the process is running under
• [char, <256 bytes] Service name if associated
• [char, <256 bytes] Window title, if the process created one
• [int] Length of above information, or binary zero if none found
Together, this information tells us about what the process is, what it is doing, and
who is running it. One particularly interesting field is the “window title”. The content
of the field is often not particularly useful, but its absence indicates a background
process of some kind. If not also associated with a service, this sort of application
invites suspicion and should be scrutinized closely.
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4 Experimental Design
To test WinSight on Windows, we devise a number of methods to both explore its
functionality and the various vagaries of Windows. We run a series of tests which
attempt to block network connections from being setup to verify the capabilities of
WinSight. We also characterize the performance of WinSight, in particular its effect on
connection setup latency and overall connection throughput. Finally, we gather traces
from the controller while a user engages in typical office environment tasks: browsing
the web, reading email, and editing documents in a word processor and spreadsheet
tool. With these traces we characterize the behavior of Windows to inform policy
decisions made with context information.
All of these tests were run within VirtualBox using a Intel i7 quad-core 4.0 GHz
CPU, of which the virtual machines were given two logical cores and 4 GB of RAM.
4.1 Blocking Tests
We performed numerous blocking tests, which can be broken down into the two broad
groupings of categorical and content. Categorical blocks refer to blocks made on a field
of the packet header and context tuple, such as the username or application path. A
content block, on the other hand, is performed against the content of a packet as seen
by the controller. This kind of block typically would be performed using deep packet
inspection, but can also be used in the PacketIn handler in the OpenFlow controller.
We perform the following types of categorical block:
Application A block against the end of the executable path in context, blocks against
the name of an application
User A block against an NT user name or domain
Window Title A block against the current window title of an application
Each of these blocks is accomplished with a simple conditional in our OpenFlow
controller logic. If WinSight matches one of these fields, it does not return a Pack-
etOut or FlowMod. Otherwise, the controller returns a PacketOut or FlowMod and
communication continues normally.
We can additionally block against any of the traditional packet header tuple fields,
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but this is trivial in OpenFlow, needing only a flow table modification message. These
tests exercise the capability of the host agent extracting context and the controller
properly reading it.
We perform a single proof of concept content block. In this test we block any
datagram which contains the string “virus”. This allows us to test our system’s ability
to perform a deep packet inspection block. To ensure that our OpenFlow controller
sees the packet we are looking for we use the utility netcat over the UDP protocol. In
this way, we ensure that the first packet sent over a flow is a datagram containing the
string virus, as opposed to something like an empty SYN packet.
4.2 Performance Tests
To characterize the performance impact of WinSight, we run connection setup latency
and throughput tests.
The connection setup latency tests are evaluated by browsing to various benchmark
websites. Using the Google Chrome web browser, we are able to get a trace of network
activity. From this we get an understanding of the total time spent loading a page, a
correlate for throughput and user experience, and for each connection made the Time
To First Byte (TTFB). TTFB lets us see the impact that WinSight has on TCP stream
setup.
We tested against the following websites:
example.com a very simple website with only a single HTTP GET request to load
cnn.com a complex website, consisting of many multimedia components all served
from various Content Distribution Networks
wpi.edu a typical Content Management System website with mostly local content
nasa.gov another website with mostly local content but lots of multimedia assets
The distinction between local and non-local assets is important to WinSight, as with
non-local assets the packet header will change (different IP address) and the system
will have to negotiate a new flow. While wpi.edu will have only a few different packet
header tuples, cnn.com might have many and require significantly more flow setup and
will take longer to load.
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In addition to these tests on HTTP performance, we also run an ICMP ping latency
test. For all tests, we run the test both with and without WinSight to see the impact
that it has. The test is duplicated to illustrate the overhead required by PacketIns
versus the latency introduced by the agent itself.
4.3 Agent Profiling
To test the internal performance of our application, we used the QueryPerformance-
Counter function set. These functions provide an API that does not suffer from pro-
cessor affinity or rely on RDTSC, which may be skewed. To ensure that the readings are
not affected by processor frequency, power optimizations are disabled and minimum
processor utilization is set to 100%. Overhead between measurements is taken to en-
sure that the times represented are accurate depictions of the calls they encapsulated
and do not count the time required by the performance counter function calls. Due
to the volume of data, measurements are logged to files such that every section of
the code, excepting code responsible for behavior including variable initialization or
memory allocation, is included.
5 Results and Discussion
We present and discuss the results of our experiments on WinSight’s performance and
functionality. The graphs above were generated from multiple trial runs, so any dis-
crepancies in the counts of data are due to updated metrics. We discarded any outliers
beyond 3 standard deviations, the count of which are listed below their respective
graphs.
WinSight performed well, with a few performance impacts. We were able to block
traffic based on several context matches, including the process, path to executable,
and service name. In terms of performance, The first packet of each flow sent through
WinSight is delayed significantly, but the sequential flow is virtually unhindered. There
are also rare times when packet reinjection takes much longer than normal, a flaw which
we attribute to the Windows Filtering Platform.
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(a) Processing time for parsing packet headers,
n=163,721 with 282 outliers. (0.172%) This in-
cludes network state table lookup resulting in
the associated process ID.
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(b) Time required for packet context extraction,
n=6,407 with 101 outliers (1.55%) This includes
all context extraction based on process ID: user-
name, executable path, service name, and first
window title.
Figure 5: Context extraction steps, these take a mostly negligible but non-zero
time.
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(a) Reinjection time for all packets including
those not matching flow rules, n=81,696 with
64 outliers (0.08%)
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(b) Handling time only for packets matching
flow rules, n=76,708 with 72 outliers (0.09%)
Figure 6: Time taken to reinject packets into the network with blocking func-
tions. These functions block until packet is redelivered by network stack, and
occasionally have very large latency.
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(a) Reinjection time for packet all packets in-
cluding those not matching flow rules, n=18,826
with 49 outliers (0.26%)
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(b) Reinjection time only for packets matching
flow rules, n=17,192 with 76 outliers (0.44%)
Figure 7: Time taken to reinject packets into the network with asynchronous
functions. These functions do not block until packet is redelivered, so these
results show that queuing a packet for redelivery is fast.
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(a) Flow escalation end-to-end, from diversion
to reinjection and including controller round
trip, n=1,566 with 41 outliers (2.55%)
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(b) Round Trip Time to controller, n=3,136
with 77 outliers (2.4%)
Figure 8: Comparison of total end to end time for an escalated flow and con-
troller round trip times. Flow escalation is clearly dominated by the controller
round trip, and not the reinjection.
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Figure 9: HTTP load times for example.com, blocking
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Without
WinSight
2nd Run
Time in ms
DNS Connection TTFB Download
Figure 10: HTTP load times for example.com, asynchronous
30
0 40 80 120 160
Without
WinSight
2nd Run
Time in seconds
DNS Connection TTFB Download
Figure 11: HTTP load times for cnn.com, blocking
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Figure 12: HTTP load times for cnn.com, asynchronous
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Figure 13: HTTP load times for wpi.edu, blocking
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Figure 14: HTTP load times for wpi.edu, asynchronous
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Figure 15: HTTP load times for nasa.gov, blocking
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Figure 16: HTTP load times for nasa.gov, asynchronous
5.1 Blocks
At the highest level, we ran a series of tests expected to block various types of traffic.
Our tests were able to block Internet traffic based off of the user or domain the process
was running under, as well as a path to the executable. Partial matches on the window
title were also found to be effective, but should not be relied upon as the sole basis of
discrimination. Window titles are subject to complications such as non-standard titles
between various applications and the ability for one process to spawn multiple windows.
Additionally, the service name is included for the process, which allows detection of
many malware processes which attempt to contact either a command node or download
more malware. These could likely be identified by a network flow that does not have
an associated service or window created, though it is of course possible for another
legitimate process to have the same behavior. The final block was a UDP datagram
with the content “virus”, showing that our module has access to the full packet contents.
32
Min
Max
Max
Avg
Avg
51
283
85
48
289
79
51
67
55 WinSight Blocking
WinSight Async
Legacy
Figure 17: ICMP ping latencies reported by Windows ping.exe (in ms)
5.2 Performance
Figure 17 shows the results of the first test, a 10-packet ICMP ping to google.com.
The times matched almost exactly, with the exception of the first ping on the WinSight
client taking 283 milliseconds to perform the PacketIn/PacketOut communication. The
numbers for asynchronous communication were very similar, with an initial connection
of 280 milliseconds and a sequential average of 79 ms.
Figure 9 through Figure 16 show the results of our website load performance test.
The webpage load times are scaled relatively, so on a page like cnn.com with a large
number of video or image CDN requests, load times of something like a JavaScript
file which takes less than a quarter or half a second are discounted, whereas on WPI’s
homepage, a few hundred milliseconds are significant. A final note is that due to
Chrome’s parallelization of network requests, the times shown here do not represent
real-time, rather the time required to complete the given operation.
In general, the initial load times are significantly higher than the legacy load times,
but this is to be expected due to the need to approve every flow connection. The average
difference between a given file transfer on the first WinSight run vs. legacy was between
2 to 4 times longer, though some of them were significantly longer, as the graphs showed.
A number of the requests would be blocked on one of the categories (usually connection
initiation or content download) for between 5-10 seconds, but occasionally more. These
delays were caused by packet reinjection and details are described in the next section.
Typically, on the second run, the disparity in load times is greatly decreased to around
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1.5 to 3 times longer. However, this is still rather high for a cached entry. After reading
through the WinDivert source code, we found that they used a tick-tock queue purging
algorithm, in which some amount of the queued packets (both inbound and outbound)
are dropped every 512 milliseconds. Another possible reason for the high overhead is
discussed later and deals with the reinjection of packets. These are issues that may
potentially be solved if packets were not all buffered into userspace and the flow table
was at least partially implemented in kernelspace, as it would bypass WinDivert.
5.3 OpenFlow Agent Performance
This section follows the path of a packet through our OpenFlow agent and performance
bottlenecks along the way. A quick review of subsubsection 3.1.1, a packet follows these
steps when passing through our OpenFlow Agent:
• A packet is received from the kernel through WinDivert
• The agent extracts header information and determines whether escalation is nec-
essary
• If not, the packet is returned to kernel through WinDivert
• Otherwise, context extraction proceeds
• TCP/UDP state tables are acquired and interrogated for a process ID associated
with a flow
• Other context is examined based on process ID
• The packet is stored in a circular buffer for later resending
• A PacketIn message is constructed and sent to the OpenFlow controller with
context appended
• A PacketOut message may be received at a later time, at which point the packet
is returned to the kernel through WinDivert.
Of these steps, the ones of most significance are header parsing, context extraction,
and the reinjection function calls.
The expenses of header parsing are illustrated in Figure 5a. The median perfor-
mance for this grouping of operations took 442 microseconds, and 95% fell under 1.08
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milliseconds. However, the top 1% were above 3.57 milliseconds. The reason for the
relatively expensive top percentage is the cost of translating a TCP/UDP port pairing
to the owning process ID. The principal cost appears to be in the retrieval of the state
table, and there was no discernible difference between the TCP and UDP protocols.
Figure 5b shows that when performing context extraction, half of the samples took
under 1.06 milliseconds, and 95% below 5.65 milliseconds. The largest expenses of
context extraction are split between username processing and associating the PID to
a service.
As another part of the host agent, we also had to implement a flow table for Open-
Flow. This implementation was efficient, with the tuple look-up taking negligible time,
99% of 81,800 measurements finishing in under 11 microseconds. All other operations
performed similarly, so we do not believe this to be worthy of future analysis. The
operations that are used to prepare for communication to and from the controller
were found to be uninteresting. These steps include interacting with the buffer and
creating/parsing OpenFlow messages.
After OpenFlow processing, whether escalated to the controller or passed back to
the kernel, Figure 7a shows the time required to reinject a packet. As is visible, most
packets can be reinjected quickly, with 95% of all reinjections taking less than 226 mi-
croseconds. Using the asynchronous method, the 99th percentile was 962 microseconds.
However, synchronously, some reinjections took extremely long, into low single-digit
seconds. These are not represented in the graphed data as this data was asynchronous
and, even with synchronous calls, those data points are statistical outliers. Regardless,
those spikes occurred approximately 0.1% of the time, which is significant in network
traffic. We provide no complete explanation for why the code exhibits this behavior,
and the asynchronous calls may simply move this delay out of the foreground and not
solve the underlying issue. Our review on the code indicates that requests are blocked
waiting on completion of a request inside of the Windows Filtering Platform, and that
source code is not available.
Figure 7b illustrates the full time required to receive a packet, check the flow ta-
bles, and reinject the packet. Figure 8a shows the same situation, but also entailing
a full round-trip to the controller. The network times are depicted in Figure 8b. The
passthrough chart is relatively uninteresting, the 95th percentile shows that packets are
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reinjected within 1.21 milliseconds, which is within tolerances due to the slight ineffi-
ciencies mentioned previously. However, the round-trip times incurred are significantly
more expensive. Note the approximate shape and order of magnitude of both graphs.
At the 50th percentile, the round-trip time requires 41.73 milliseconds, and the full es-
calation time is 41.62 milliseconds. This suggests that packet escalation is dominated
by the round trip communication with the controller. At the 95th percentile, the total
time is 243.95 milliseconds versus a RTT of 273.8 milliseconds, which again suggests
the round trip dominates and that it is more volatile. This is reasonable considering
the use of a Python controller running inside a virtual machine.
Finally, we note that timing the receipt of a packet is difficult due to the blocking
nature of the WinDivertRecv function and asynchronous calls to WinDivertSendEx.
We cannot differentiate between either blocking on an empty queue and time spent
copying a packet, or the time spent between dispatching a packet and its reinjection,
without modifying WinDivert.
5.4 Discussion
Our results suggest that an approach using a divert socket into userspace like WinDivert
has surprisingly good performance in the median case, and bad performance in the
worst case. By far, our performance is dwarfed by expensive reinjection, which should
be the target of future improvements. There are improvements to be made by using
a controller with better performance characteristics and possibly in context extraction
where the network state table look-up can block for a long time.
We think there are two plausible explanations to the poor worst case performance
for reinjection. Either the Windows Filtering Platform injection handle queue is full
and applying back-pressure against our injection requests, or we are being negatively
impacted by process scheduling. The injection handle queue filling up seems unlikely
as the queue should be getting drained at about line rate for the system, and it is
very unlikely our userspace application is generating traffic that quickly. Instead,
we believe that our OpenFlow Agent is getting preempted in the middle of servicing
an I/O request, causing artificially bad results. The Windows process scheduler will
context-switch away from the application when it blocks on a call to WinDivertSend.
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WinDivert will then receive a request and service it, calling into the Windows Filtering
Platform and waiting for an asynchronous callback indicating completion of the injec-
tion. WinDivert will then complete the applications request, unblocking it. At this
point the scheduler can resume execution of the OpenFlow agent, but it does not have
to. Another high priority process could be running, and several other high priority
I/O requests and interrupts may need to be serviced first. In this way we could see in
really pathological cases a multi-second delay while blocking on WinDivertSend. We
discuss possibilities for mitigating this in subsection 6.1
6 Concluding Remarks
Distributed firewalls allow network controllers to block malicious traffic and prevent
attacks. However, the information given to these controllers is limited, as the context
for the traffic is not normally specified. WinSight provides a tool which enables an
OpenFlow controller to make a more informed decision when filtering network flows by
including host context with every PacketIn. We were able to make a basic OpenFlow
agent, collect contextual information, and provide that to a custom PacketIn handler
in the POX OpenFlow controller. Excluding statistical outliers, our implementation
incurs reasonable overheads and applies fine-grain filter rules informed by contextual
information. Coarse grained contextual ACLs can be enforced in a similar fashion as
fine-grain OpenFlow rules.
6.1 Future Work
There are clear directions for future work on WinSight on Windows. The current
implementation suffers from poor performance in the worst case, but there are several
possible strategies for mitigating this. The adaptation of the Linux subsystem for
Windows 10 may provide the ability to use software we were unable to port. Policy
with host context data also needs exploration: what kinds of new applications and
monitoring does it allow? Finally WinSight could make several existing OpenFlow-
SDN applications more practically applicable by moving filtering burden onto end
hosts. All of these avenues can and should be explored.
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Performance of the existing WinSight prototype on Windows is not quite ready for
a trial deployment. We have shown that in the median case performance is actually
quite good, but in the worst case performance is bad, with the two separated by a
significant four orders of magnitude (when blocking). We believe that this is caused
by pathological user-space process scheduling behavior and the use of a synchronous
blocking programming model in our prototype. The Windows process scheduler does
not treat our user-space filtering prototype with a high enough priority and causes
us to see multi-second delays in packet reinjection. The blocking programming model
means that we ignore new packets arriving on the divert socket and traffic gets un-
necessarily blocked. With the switch to the asynchronous model, the performance
increased significantly, but we cannot confidently say that the performance issue seen
in the synchronous model was not merely pushed into the background.
We think that adopting an asynchronous event-based model will reduce the amount
of time that the OpenFlow agent spends being blocked, and make this inherently
concurrent application easier to reason about. All of the interactions with WinDivert
can be done asynchronously with WinDivertRecvEx and WinDivertSendEx, allowing us
to relinquish control to callbacks from the kernel. The callback for WinDivertRecvEx
places a packet on the queue for flow table filtering and possible escalation. A thread
or thread poll reads from the filtering queue and either escalates the packet or puts it
in a queue for reinjection. The callback for WinDivertSendEx removes an enqueued
packet from the reinjection queue. This architecture would avoid blocking except on
the internal queues, which will be notified by external events from the kernel. This
mitigates the poor performance seen when WinDivertSend calls block for a long time,
but appears to not fully resolve the issue seen by the blocking WinDivertSend function.
Performance can further be improved by filtering in the kernel and avoiding the
user-space scheduler and copying costs all together. This can be achieved with simple
improvements to WinDivert. The primary limitation of WinDivert is that it has a
static filter described by a filter. While this fits the exploratory divert socket use case
quite well, it does not fit for a dynamic OpenFlow flow table and filter.
We can extend WinDivert to be dynamic without modifying the kernel driver.
Recall that in the Windows Filtering Platform, all sublayers in a filtering layer are
evaluated, but a sublayer is traversed in priority ordering until a filter matches and
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returns a decision. We can perform dynamic filtering simply by placing WinDivert in
the lowest priority in a sublayer and inserting filters in the same sublayer. This filter
management can be done entirely from user-space, meaning that this approach does
not even require significant kernel-level development.
However, this approach will not allow for more complicated forms of OpenFlow
actions, only dropping traffic. For the initial purposes of WinSight, this should be
sufficient, and future work could also develop a feature-rich OpenFlow table filtering
callout for the Windows Filtering Platform. Such a system should mimic the archi-
tecture of Open Virtual Switch [27] and start with an exact match “microflow” cache.
This could similarly be placed in higher priority than the divert socket callout. If this
solution has poor performance because of cache thrashing, the OVS “megaflow” cache
could similarly be inserted between the “microflow” cache and the divert socket.
While we demonstrated deep packet inspection capabilities with our system, at
present they are rather limited. The traditional OpenFlow model only generates a
PacketIn for the first message in a flow, which keeps network usage and computational
costs down at the expense of visibility into traffic. Our current system would only be
able to examine the first packet of a flow, and since most traffic in a network is carried
over TCP and the first packet in a TCP flow is the empty SYN message, there is no
content from the stream available for analysis. If deep packet inspection is required,
a practical approach could be to combine the host-based enforcement and context of
WinSight with the distributed enforcement and centralized policy decision model of
EnforSDN. In EnforSDN, a traditional network appliance makes policy decisions for
the network, but the network enforces the policy [7].
Further, the context gathering or transmission portion of WinSight currently is
not optimized. For example, a virus could name itself winword.exe and the current
dataset would have nothing to validate or discriminate between Microsoft Word and
a file masquerading as Microsoft Word. Including a signature for executables could
distinguish a malicious file from a Microsoft- or otherwise-certified binary. Additionally,
the protocol for storing and transmitting the context can greatly increase the amount
of data required to transmit a PacketIn, due to the ability to store up to 255 characters
in fields such as paths and executable names. A compression scheme could likely reduce
the size of data that is required to be sent.
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6.2 Trial Deployment
For a trial deployment of WinSight, the POX OpenFlow controller would be set up on a
LAN, with the WinSight agent installed on computers connected to the LAN. WinSight
creates the ability to examine packet context information, but it does not come with
any rules on context by default. Rules can be implemented on the controller by adding
to the _handle_PacketIn function in the POX module. For instance, in order to
add a rule which blocks packets from a program with the window title “badprogram”,
an if-statement can be placed which checks the title portion of the context data for
the string “badprogram”. If the string exists in the title, a return statement can be
added to prevent the controller from sending back a PacketOut message. Without this
PacketOut message, the agent will never re-inject the packet into the network stack,
successfully blocking the traffic.
WinSight does not require every computer to have an agent, but those without
the agent will not benefit from the security enhancements. As such, it is possible for
a computer to operate on the network normally without the agent. If this computer
sends traffic to another computer with the WinSight agent installed, the traffic will
be evaluated by the controller. With this in mind, it is possible to do an incremental
deployment on a LAN, where only some computers have WinSight installed. This is
desirable because WinSight could be deployed on a subset of the available systems
without requiring full commitment. The ability to be partially deployed is also useful
for when computers connecting to the LAN are not permanent residents, such as laptops
and smart-phones. With this functionality, WinSight can protect core computers with
sensitive data, while leaving the network accessible to temporary connections.
To test the trial deployment, there are two high-level attack vectors to consider:
from within the network, and from beyond the network. An attack within the network
involves the source of the attack to be connected to the LAN with WinSight. The
attacker would attempt to spread malware through the LAN while WinSight would
have to prevent it. This test should be done both with and without WinSight installed
on the attacking computer. In a real-world scenario, this would likely be carried out
through corporate espionage or social engineering, such as malware left on a “lost”
flash drive. An attack from beyond the network is similar to the aforementioned test,
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except the attacking computer attempts to reach the LAN from across the Internet.
This attack cannot be carried out with WinSight installed on the attacking computer,
as the attacker is not connected to the LAN. The attacker would likely attempt similar
attacks against WinSight and legacy networks.
A WinDivert Installation
I. Enable test driver signing: bcdedit.exe -set testsigning on
This allows a locally generated certificate to be used without being signed by
some trusted root certificate authority.
II. Obtain WinDivert from https://www.reqrypt.org/windivert.html
III. Create a certificate and store for the WinDivert driver: MakeCert -r -pe -ss
WinDivertStore -n "CN=WinDivert" WinDivert.cer.
IV. Add the new certificate to the machine’s trusted root store: CertMgr /add
WinDivert.cer /s /r localMachine root.
V. Sign WinDivert driver with certificate used in last command: SignTool sign /v
/s WinDivertStore /n WinDivert WinDivert[32|64].sys
VI. Restart machine. On restart driver will be loaded.
B Alternate Approaches
This appendix discusses optimizations and alternative approaches that we believe are
noteworthy.
One of our major concerns regarding our design and implementation is that every
packet must cross the boundary between kernel and user space. While the performance
timings reveal this is not as severe as expected, it is still significant. Because of the
nature of kernel memory, the kernel/user-space crossover we rely upon means that
a packet must be fully copied into user space, and then copied back to kernel space
again. Including the step to get the packet from a network device into kernel space
and back out, there are four total copies made, and our approach has doubled the
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number. Copying packets in memory can be expensive, so we expect to see this affect
our throughput and latency, as discussed in Figure 5.
We do believe that the fundamental design, using OpenFlow with context in-band
on host agents, allows for more flexible control of network policy. The following ap-
proach merely changes the way our host agent is implemented.
B.1 Kernel Fast Path
To overcome the throughput and latency limitations created by having to buffer packets
between the user-space OpenFlow Agent and kernel-space WinDivert driver, we suggest
that the agent be split in half, providing a “slow path” and a “fast path.”
The “slow path” sits in userspace and behaves similarly to our current OpenFlow
Agent. If it does not have an entry for a flow, it generates a PacketIn and the con-
troller responds with a FlowMod or a PacketOut as normal. When the agent receives
the FlowMod, in addition to updating the user space flow tables, it additionally com-
municates the flow information to the kernel space “fast path.”
The kernel space “fast path” avoids the expensive copying of packets by keeping a
cache of flow information and only communicates with the user space agent on a cache
miss. This means that there will still be at least user to kernel space latency on the
startup of a flow, but once it is permitted or blocked it never has to leave the kernel
space fast path. This echoes the construction of most OpenFlow switches, which have
a software slow path for handling OpenFlow table misses and a fast path consisting of
specialized hardware and TCAM. It also echoes the design of Open Virtual Switch, a
host based OpenFlow agent for the Linux operating system whose design is described
in [27].
We believe that though modification of the WinDivert driver could feasibly provide
this method, it would not be significantly easier than designing a module by hand.
However, as the next section details, we had many challenges in our attempts to do so.
B.2 Kernel Driver
We attempted to develop our own kernel driver using the community edition of Visual
Studio 2015 in place of WinDivert. However, we ran into significant challenges setting
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up the debugging environment, whether using physical media, network transmission, or
other methods, both on virtual and physical machines. This method will likely perform
better than the WinDivert user-space interaction, but due to time constraints and the
challenges we ran into, we decided to abandon this approach. One of the challenges
we ran into while delving into the Windows kernel and networking API was finding
that the MSDN documentation is inconsistent and often impossible to replicate listed
feature sets. We also contacted a student who had successfully completed a Windows
driver as part of his project the about two months prior to our efforts. He was unable
to successfully recreate his kernel development environment, at which point we decided
to proceed with other options.
The library we primarily attempted to develop in was the Windows Filtering
Platform (WFP). Additionally, we researched Network Driver Interface Specification
(NDIS), but ultimately found it to be too low-level to be useful. What follows is what
we consider the relevant knowledge in the WFP API obtained through our research for
any other projects looking for guidance in this domain.
The Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) is a set of APIs and services that allow
the creation of network filtering applications, which can be used for the OpenFlow
Agent datapath. WFP operates on multiple layers of the network stack and allows
the interception of packets before they are transmitted to the network or pushed up
to the receiving application. The WFP API allows control via userspace applications,
but will do the majority of its processing in kernel space. This means packets do not
have to be passed into or out of kernel space for processing, making it inherently faster
than the system we chose to use.
A session to WFP’s filter engine can be opened by calling the function FwpmEngine-
Open0, which returns an engine handle. A filter can be added by calling FwpmFilterAdd0,
which takes in the engine handle and a filter defined by the struct FWPM_FILTER0. The
arguments to FWPM_FILTER0 contains a layer key, an array of filter conditions, and an
action, amongst other fields. The layer-key is the GUID of the layer where the filter re-
sides, such as FWPM_LAYER_INBOUND_IPPACKET_V4. The filter conditions are defined by
the struct FWPM_FILTER_CONDITION_0, which contains the field to be tested, a match
type, and the value for the field to be matched against. The action is defined by the
struct FWPM_ACTION0, and can be set to block or permit packet flows. The action
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can also be set to invoke a callout on the packet, which can be either a built-in or
user-written function.
To implement WinSight’s datapath using WFP, callouts for sending packet flows
to and receiving packet flows from the controller are needed. Doing so will avoid
sending decision requests on traffic destined for the controller, to the controller, as
this will create a cycle. Until a response is received from the controller, the function
FwpsPendOperation0 can be used to postpone a classification decision on a packet
flow. Once a packet flow is ready to be fully processed, packet operations can be
resumed by calling FwpsCompleteOperation0. If the packet flow is deemed safe by
the controller, a filter with a permit action will be installed on that flow. If the packet
flow is deemed dangerous, a filter with a block action can be installed. When a flow
is deemed dangerous, packets from that flow can be silently dropped to prevent the
origin machine from detecting a block.
B.3 xDPd as an OpenFlow Agent
As a final mention, we looked into using an existing OpenFlow agent instead of writing
our own from scratch. The eXtensible DataPath Daemon (xDPd), a project of the
Berlin Institute for Software Defined Networks (BISDN), aims to provide a common
set of tools for creating OpenFlow switches and is intended to ease the implementation
burden when trying to prototype a new OpenFlow device or perform research [8]. In
that regard it is a perfect match for our needs. It consists of three major parts from
the Revised OpenFlow Library (rofl): rofl-common which handles an OpenFlow chan-
nel and turns messages into internal events, rofl-pipeline which implements a software
OpenFlow switch with flow tables, and rofl-hal which provides API hooks for a hard-
ware abstraction layer. With xDPd, we need only write platform support for Windows
that hooks into the rofl-hal API, and we would get a full OpenFlow switch. Unfor-
tunately xDPd makes numerous assumptions about the target system, namely that it
is a POSIX system, and worse has certain Linux APIs exposed. These assumptions
made it difficult to bring xDPd into the Windows environment; significant effort would
have to be invested to port it for actual use. However, rofl-pipeline is largely platform
independent and implements fast flow table search algorithms. If developing a fast
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OpenFlow switch implementation, it may be a good starting point. However, we did
not believe it was worth the time for this version, as we were looking to prove the idea is
feasible and the efficiency difference did not warrant the expenditure of effort required.
With the recent addition of the Linux subsystem to Windows 10 insider builds, this
may be a worthwhile topic to investigate.
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